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KARST, SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY, AND THE LAW
Abstract
Courts struggle to deal with evidence relating to the 
existence of karst terrain and the impact of human 
activities on karst terrain. Although courts often must 
hear cases involving complex scientific issues, karst 
seems to prove especially problematic, perhaps because 
of the lack of uniformity and the site-specific nature of 
the resource.
Helping Others Maintain Environmental Standards 
(HOME) v. Bos, 406 Ill.App.3d 669, 941 N.E.2d 347 
(2010) (“Bos”), represents the most extreme example 
of a court struggling with evidence relating to karst 
matters. The court found against the plaintiffs, primarily 
because the expert witness admitted that additional 
testing could have been done, but was not, due in part 
to financial constraints. One legal treatise referred to 
the defense’s “relentless theme of studies not done” as 
“raging, fuming, “it’s-all-an-environmental-conspiracy” 
presentation (Rogers Environmental Law, 2d., Section 
4:18). This case explicitly raises the questions that many 
others implicitly raise. How many studies are enough? 
Which studies are sufficient?
The Bos case and a variety of other published opinions 
involve courts analyzing expert testimony as to karst 
matters and determining whether such evidence is 
sufficient. Examination of these cases proves useful 
for future litigants and experts. The cases examined 
involve a variety of situations, including Environmental 
Impact Assessments and various citizen challenges 
to development. The review reveals that courts apply 
inconsistent standards and then use inconsistent analysis 
in the application. Some of the inconsistency can be 
explained by the context of the case, while others cannot.
Analysis of the court cases indicate that courts are 
generally ill-equipped to deal with expert testimony 
related to karst matters and that this testimony may prove 
to be more problematic than other technical, scientific 
evidence due to the nature of karst as a heterogeneous 
resource depending upon site-specific studies and 
examination. This circumstance further raises the issue 
of the cost of expert testimony relating to karst in court 
cases and whether karst investigations should instead 
be conducted by state or federal agencies. However, if 
these agencies should conduct the investigations, do the 
agencies have adequate resources to do so?
The paper recommends that the scientific karst 
community further educate lawyers, judges and 
citizens on the scientific aspects of karst, including the 
heterogeneous nature of karst. Ultimately, however, 
expert witnesses in karst matters will be forced to 
incorporate education of the court into their reports and 
testimony, to the extent that the court allows.
Introduction
Courts struggle to understand increasingly complex and 
technical expert testimony in a broad range of cases. 
However, nowhere is this struggle more evident than 
with respect to expert testimony related to karst. In 2010, 
a state court in Illinois decided a case that drew national 
attention for the court’s extraordinary comments on 
expert witness testimony on a karst issue. The context of 
the case raises a number of issues on expert testimony, 
including how courts should evaluate the testimony, 
who should pay for expert testimony and whether 
experts must conduct every test possible. Examination 
of this case, along with the handful of additional court 
cases in the United States that evaluate expert testimony 
on karst, yields some basic principles that should guide 
expert witnesses and litigants in karst matters. 
The Nature of Expert Testimony
The Federal Rules of Evidence set forth the guidelines 
for qualification as an expert witness and for evaluation 
of expert witness testimony in federal courts. An 
expert qualifies by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education (Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 
702). Opinions expressed must meet the following 
requirements: (1) the expert’s scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and, (4) the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case Federal 
Rules of Evidence Rule 702). An expert may base their 
opinion on facts and data personally observed or facts 
and data the witness has been made aware of (Federal 
Rules of Evidence Rule 703).
Rules that apply in most state courts are either based on 
or similar to the Federal Rules. Judges have fairly broad 
discretion in applying the rules. 
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Another issue that proves important in understanding 
these issues involve the relationship between trial courts 
and appellate courts. Trial courts find the facts and then 
apply the law to the facts to make rulings. If a jury is 
seated, the jury finds the facts and the court instructs the 
jury on the law to apply. If no jury sits, the judge in the 
trial court finds the facts and applies the law. Appellate 
courts hear legal arguments and generally do not hear 
witnesses or admit additional evidence. 
Therefore, appellate courts generally defer to the trial 
court, or the court that hears the testimony, on facts. 
Facts include judgements about expert testimony. 
The trial court is held to an “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard on factual issues. With respect to legal issues, 
the appellate court generally owes no deference to the 
trial court and may apply the law as the appellate court 
interprets the law.
An Illinois Case Creates Uncertainty 
for Expert Testimony
Introduction
In Helping Others Maintain Environmental Standards 
v. Bos, 406 Ill.App.3d 669, 941 N.E.2d 347 (2010) 
(“Bos”), a citizen group (HOMES) filed suit against 
the developer of a large dairy facility and the Illinois 
Department of Agriculture to prevent the construction 
of the dairy. The citizen’s group had an employee of the 
Illinois State Geological Survey, who was not paid by 
HOMES, testify as an expert witness on their behalf. The 
trial court ultimately ruled against HOMES. The case 
was appealed by HOMES. Most importantly for this 
analysis, the appellate court approved the trial court’s 
holding that HOMES did not meet the requirements to 
obtain a permanent injunction. 
Specifically, HOMES needed to demonstrate a high 
probability of groundwater contamination from the 
dairy. HOMES has an employee of the Illinois State 
Geological Survey testify as to the high probability. 
Bos’ expert witnesses testified otherwise. The trial court 
found that HOMES failed to prove the high probability 
of groundwater contamination. The appellate court ruled 
that the trial court finding was reasonable and upheld the 
finding.
Facts of the Case
Bos proposed to build two large dairies, each of which 
would hold 6,850 animal units in the form of dairy 
cows and calves. One of the facilities would have 
three livestock waste holding ponds. To move forward, 
Bos needed approval from the Illinois Department of 
Agriculture. Eight siting requirements must be met to 
receive approval under the Illinois Livestock Act. The 
requirements ask whether:
(1) registration and livestock waste management plan 
certification requirements were met by the notice of 
intent to construct; 
(2) the design, location, or proposed operation would 
protect the environment by being consistent with the 
Livestock Act; 
(3) the location minimized incompatibility with the area’s 
character by being zoned for agriculture or complying 
with the Livestock Act’s setback requirements; 
(4) the facility was in a 100–year flood plain or an 
environmentally sensitive area and, if so, whether the 
proposed construction standards were consistent with 
protecting the area’s safety; 
(5) the owner or operator submitted plans to minimize 
the likelihood of environmental damage from spills, 
runoff, and leaching; 
(6) odor control plans were reasonable and incorporated 
odor reduction technologies; 
(7) traffic patterns minimized the effect on existing 
traffic flow; and 
(8) construction of the facility was consistent with 
community growth, tourism, recreation, or economic 
development through compliance with applicable 
zoning and setback requirements. 
(510 ILCS 77/ 12(d)).
Requirement (4), which provides for heightened 
construction standards in karst areas, formed the focus 
of the case and the expert testimony. “Environmentally 
sensitive area” includes a karst area or an area with 
aquifer material within five feet of the bottom of the 
waste facility. Much of the dispute focused on whether 
the proposed facility was in a “karst area”. The lawsuit 
alleged that the bedrock underlying the proposed facility 
and in the area of the facility consisted of Galena 
Group Carbonate Rock with karst features. These 
geologic conditions make the groundwater in the area 
highly susceptible to contamination according to the 
allegations. Specifically, the claims of HOMES centered 
on the issue of whether the waste containment pond 
liners were inadequately designed because the design 
failed to consider the karst terrain. 
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Panno testified that karstified carbonate bedrock was 
“a crucial component of [HOME’s] case” (Bos, 374). 
Panno admitted that he failed to make a site-specific 
investigation. He based his opinion on LiDAR imagery, 
examination of aerial photos and field investigations. The 
testimony indicated that Panno used LiDAR imagery to 
locate fractures in the carbonate rock. One lineament 
underlain a waste holding pond, but Panno admitted that 
lineaments are an interpretative tool to indicate where 
to look for further information. One photo appeared to 
show a spring, but Panno admitted that he could not 
definitely identify the feature as a spring. The testimony 
failed to tie his findings directly to the site of the waste 
holding ponds, with the information mainly coming 
from outside the site (Ibid).
Panno similarly testified that elevated levels of sodium 
chloride could indicate susceptibility of the karst aquifer, 
but admitted that similar levels had been found in non-
karst areas. His investigation failed to include testing of 
wells near the dairy for bacteria. Panno admitted that 
such tests were a “good idea” to detect a connection 
between septic systems and the wells (Ibid).
Panno testified that Bos should have measured stream 
flow, performed groundwater chemistry evaluation, 
installed monitoring wells and conducted dye tracing, but 
he failed to take the same steps (Bos, 374). He admitted 
that a site-specific analysis would most appropriately 
determine the characteristics of the site. Panno also 
called into question the testimony of another expert 
who had suggested that the presence of weathered or 
highly weathered limestone in rock corings and borings 
indicated karstic bedrock. Panno stated that not all such 
bedrock is karstified carbonate bedrock.
The trial court also seemed to place great weight on 
Panno’s admission that a number of additional tests 
could have been conducted to provide more definitive 
indications of whether karst terrain underlain the 
proposed dairy site. Specifically, Panno did not evaluate 
groundwater chemistry, conduct well monitoring or use 
dye tracing. Panno failed to take these steps due to cost 
(Ibid). The State Geological Survey had few resources 
and so various tests were not done (Bos, 375). He did 
not ask HOMES to fund the studies because that is 
“not something we do” (Ibid). The state funding was so 
limited that staff would “drive 10 hours round trip and do 
10 hours of fieldwork in one day because there was no 
money to stay overnight in a hotel” (Ibid).
However, no rock corings from the site were examined 
and no bacterial well data from the area were sought. 
Karst Areas and Location of Livestock 
Waste Handling Facilities
The Illinois Livestock Act defines “karst area” as “an area 
with a land surface containing sinkholes, large springs, 
disrupted land drainage, and underground drainage 
systems associated with karstified carbonate bedrock 
and caves or a land surface without those features but 
containing a karstified carbonate bedrock unit generally 
overlain by less than 60 feet of unconsolidated materials” 
(510 ILCS 77/10.24). “Karstified carbonate bedrock” 
is defined as “a carbonate bedrock unit (limestone or 
dolomite) that has a pronounced conduit or secondary 
porosity due to dissolution of the rock along joints, 
fractures, or bedding plains” (510 ILCS 77/10.26).
Under administrative regulations, if the “proposed 
livestock waste handling facility is to be located within 
an area designated as ‘Sink hole areas’ on ‘Karst Terrains 
and Carbonate Rocks of Illinois’, IDNR–ISGS Illinois 
Map 8”2, or if soil samples from within 20 feet of the 
livestock waste handling facility boundaries indicate that 
the waste handling facility is in a “karst area,” additional 
inspections and tests are required (35 Ill. Adm. Code §§ 
506.302(b), (g)). If a livestock waste handling facility 
is in a karst area, the waste facility must be designed to 
prevent seepage of waste into groundwater (510 ILCS 
77/13(b)(2); 35 Ill. Adm.Code § 506.312(a)) and is to 
be constructed using a rigid material such as concrete or 
steel (35 Ill. Adm.Code § 506.312(b)). 
However, the facility’s owner or operator may receive 
the Department’s permission to “modify or exceed 
these standards in order to meet site specific objectives” 
(35 Ill. Adm. Code § 506.312(c)). In such a situation, 
the owner or operator must demonstrate that the 
modification is at least as protective of the groundwater, 
surface water, and structural integrity of the waste 
facility as are the regulation’s requirements (35 Ill. Adm.
Code § 506.312(c)). No livestock waste facility may be 
constructed within 400 feet of a natural depression in a 
karst area (510 ILCS 77/13(b)(2); 35 Ill. Adm.Code § 
506.302(g)(1)).
The Expert Testimony
The trial turned on the expert witnesses on each side. 
HOMES relied mainly on evidence presented by Samuel 
Panno. Panno is a senior scientist with the Illinois 
State Geological Survey. The state Attorney General’s 
Office originally asked Panno to get involved in the 
case, presumably on behalf of the state (Bos, 374). The 
Attorney General’s Office later changed their mind and 
decided that the state should not be involved (Ibid). 
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Geological Atlas of Rice County that indicated that the 
proposed feedlot would be in an area with a moderate 
risk of karst. (Terpstra, 3). 
The board questioned the accuracy of the information, 
noting that the conclusions were based only on 
topographical features and that no soil samples or wells 
samples were collected or analyzed (Ibid). The board 
concluded that “no evidence exists which suggests that 
Far-Gaze Farms’ proposal would endanger the health, 
safety and welfare of the county’s citizens.” (Terpstra, 
3). 
The court found that while the evidence may not have 
significant probative value, the evidence “suggests” 
that karst exists in the area. (Ibid). Therefore, the 
proposal may endanger the health, safety and welfare 
of the county’s citizens. However, the court upheld 
the approval of the permit. Terpstra failed to present 
evidence on the accuracy of the Geological Survey maps, 
the degree of danger presented by karst or how likely 
sinkhole formation is in a karst area (Ibid). No evidence 
on the record showing the relationship between a “karst 
problem” and public health and safety (Ibid).
Olmsted County Concerned Citizens 
v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 
2010 WL 4941663 (Ct. App. Minn. 2010) 
(unpublished)
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) 
decided not to require an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) for a proposed ethanol facility. Olmsted 
County Concerned Citizens (OCCC) filed suit, claiming 
that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and not 
supported by the evidence. Public comments on the 
draft Environmental Assessment Worksheet included 
concerns about the karst geological features, data and 
modeling methodologies, and spills and emergency 
responses. (Olmsted County Concerned Citizens, 1). 
After a public hearing before the MPCA Citizen’s Board 
(the “Board”), the Board delayed its decision and asked 
the MPCA to prepare a set of findings that would require 
a limited-scope EIS on several issues including surface 
water and groundwater interactions in karst geological 
areas and the adequacy of a 30-day pump test to predict 
the quantity and quality of water in the karst geological 
areas (Ibid, 2). At a second hearing, after receiving further 
information, the MPCA Citizen’s Board determined that 
the proposed ethanol plant did not have the potential for 
significant environmental effects and voted unanimously 
that an EIS was not required. OCCC filed suit.
These tests would not be prohibitively expensive (Bos, 
374). The court characterized HOMES’ evidence as 
“vague” as to specific contaminants, concentrations and 
release mechanisms (Ibid).
The court placed greater weight on the evidence presented 
the expert witnesses for Bos. The court favorably cited 
the regional and site-specific investigations, including 
examination of rock corings and well data. The Bos 
experts concluded that the area was not karst and that 
facility design was sufficient to protect groundwater 
(Ibid). Bos also argued that certain information that 
Panno failed to disclose at the trial for the preliminary 
injunction entitled them to damages (Ibid).
Conclusions
Commentators reacted incredulously to the standard 
that the Bos case appeared to set. “The defense puts on 
a raging, fuming, “it’s-all-an-environmental-conspiracy” 
presentation, and the court sits there meekly, absorbing 
every word of it. The relentless theme of studies 
not done…is of course the stuff of routine cross-
examination” (Rodgers and Burleson, Section 4.18). 
The fact that Panno, a civil servant, served as the expert 
witness for the citizen group also raises the issue of 
whether state or federal agencies should provide neutral 
expert testimony. In addition, the case raises the question 
of whether “the “studies not done” should be assigned to 
the citizens or undertaken by the authorities themselves” 
(Ibid). However, if state or federal agencies should serve 
as experts for the courts, significant additional funding 
needs to be provided.
Other Karst Expert Testimony Cases
Introduction 
A handful of other published court opinions also address 
the standards for expert testimony in cases where karst 
plays an important role. These cases appear in a variety 
of contexts. Although none of the cases present holdings 
as dramatic or far-reaching as Bos, the opinions, 
cumulatively, present guidelines that expert witnesses 
and litigants should heed in future cases
Terpstra v. Peterson 1999 WL 289283 (Ct. 
App. Minn. 1999)
Terpstra challenged the approval of a conditional use 
permit for a covered hog feedlot and alleged that the 
granting of the permit was arbitrary and capricious. 
(Terpstra, 1). Terpstra contended that an Environmental 
Assessment Worksheet should have been completed. 
However, the Rice County Board of Commissions 
determined that an EAW was not necessary and voted 
to approve the permit. Terpstra presented maps from the 
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In re Louisiana Energy Services, LP, 2010 
WL 3969642 (Ct. App. New Mexico 2010)
Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping 
(CARD) objected to the granting of a groundwater 
discharge permit to Louisiana Energy Services, LP 
(Louisiana Energy). CARD appealed a ruling of the 
lower court that, among other things, found that CARD’s 
proffered expert witness did not qualify as an expert on 
the matter before the court. 
The expert, Dr. Richard Phillips, testified that he had a 
Ph.D. in geomorphology and that CARD had retained 
him seventeen days earlier to investigate the ground 
water hydrology in the immediate vicinity of the site (In 
re Louisiana Energy Services, LP, 1). Phillips submitted 
a report about karst aquifers at the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, sixty to seventy miles from the 
Louisiana Energy site. Based on a field investigation he 
conducted north of the Louisiana Energy site, Phillips 
concluded that the Louisiana Energy site was in a karst 
region. 
Phillips based his finding primarily on a structural 
depression that holds water ephemerally, and Baker 
Spring, which holds water perennially. Phillips testified 
that the depression and Baker Spring were “telltale 
features of a karst terrain.” His testimony indicated that 
the karstic formation would likely be affected by runoff 
from the site. Phillips admitted that he had spent only 
one day in the field to support his findings and that he 
failed to visit the Louisiana Energy site (Ibid). 
Expert witnesses for Louisiana Energy contradicted 
Phillips’s testimony, asserting that the karst-like features 
observed by Phillips could have been caused by human 
activity. (In re Louisiana Energy Services, LP, 2) These 
witnesses concluded that no karst existed on the site, that 
Baker spring was not related to the site and evidence of 
karst on the site would not affect the viability of their 
operations on the site due to the hydrology in the area, 
and the practices and protections on the site.
The trial court concluded that Phillips failed to qualify 
as an expert witness in this case (Ibid, 5). The key 
findings to support this ruling included Phillips’s failure 
to visit the site and the fact that Phillips’s conclusions 
were based on karst features on an unrelated site and 
study of another site sixty miles from the Louisiana 
Energy Services site (Ibid). Citing New Mexico Rules 
of Evidence, similar to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed 
this ruling, finding that the trial court’s ruling was 
not arbitrary and capricious (In re Louisiana Energy 
Services, LP, 4-5).
With respect to dye tracing tests, the MPCA maintained 
that the tests were not needed because of the groundwater 
protection provided by the design of the plant. In addition, 
no open or free draining karst features exist on the 
property to allow the introduction of dyes. Furthermore, 
the “intensive site investigations and geophysics work” at 
the site vitiated the need for dye tracing (Olmsted County 
Concerned Citizens, 4). As for leaks and spills in light of 
karst geology, the court found that the record contained 
significant information indicating that the site contained 
few karst characteristics. If fractures or cavities in the 
bedrock were encountered in the excavation stage, plans 
were in place to address the issues (Ibid, 10). Based 
on the evidence, the decision was not arbitrary and 
capricious and was backed by substantial evidence.
Karst Environmental Education and 
Protection, Inc. v. Federal Highway 
Administration, 2011 WL 5301589 (U.S. Dist. 
Ct., W.D. Kentucky 2011)
Karst Environmental Education and Protection, Inc. 
(KEEP) challenged the adequacy of the geologic survey 
relied on by the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) as “cursory”. (Karst Environmental Education 
and Protection, 18). The group argued the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires an in-depth 
karst analysis, including dye tracing and computer 
modeling of groundwater (Hoosier Envtl. Council, 1). 
The study here failed to discuss karst topography “as a 
whole”, focusing only on the largest caves and sinkholes. 
(Karst Environmental Education and Protection, 18). 
KEEP also faulted the method by which the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) tabulated the 
biological impact on the caves. The FEIS measured 
the distance from the Project area to the mouth of the 
cave. KEEP maintained that, given the speed by which 
groundwater could move, proximity to the cave opening 
is immaterial. The network of underground streams and 
passageways are much closer to the project. 
The court rejected the arguments, citing the relative scale 
and impact of the project in this case and the project in 
Hoosier Envtl. The project at issue creates a connector 
road 3.8 miles long, whereas Hoosier Envtl involved 
a highway of over 140 miles. (Karst Environmental 
Education and Protection, 19). While acknowledging 
that the agency “could have” done more, the court 
found that the FHWA took the required “hard look” at 
the kart issues, finding that the review was proportionate 
to the size of the action. (Ibid). “[P]racticability and 
reasonableness must be taken into account…to preserve 
the values and amenities of the natural environment” 
(Envtl. Defense Fund, 468).
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investigation, and may be interpreted to require costly, 
and even cost-prohibitive tests. However, no other court 
has gone that far. 
The Bos case also raise troubling questions of whether 
the burden of providing expert testimony should be 
placed on private citizens, who will rarely be able to 
match corporate opponents, or whether state and federal 
agencies should be funded to give them the ability to 
provide unbiased evidence to courts. Obviously, the cost 
of retaining an expert witness may be an insurmountable 
burden to many citizen groups. To conduct “every 
possible study” would eliminate even more groups from 
participation in the judicial process.
Courts also appear to struggle to understand the 
complexities of expert testimony relating to karst issues. 
Expert witnesses and the litigants who employ them 
should keep these issues in mind. Judges and juries must 
be educated in order to comprehend and analyze expert 
witness testimony relating to karst.
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Conclusions
The four cases cited in this section involve karst expert 
testimony in a variety of contexts. However, the cases 
present consistent principles. As indicated by these cases, 
the courts generally defer to the administrative agency. 
To rebut the agency, evidence must be substantial and 
show serious error on behalf of the agency. Testimony 
should be based on a site-specific investigation, the 
findings should be specific, and the evidence should 
clearly link impacts to the existence of karst features. 
The cases in this section do not extend as far as the 
Bos case in requiring expert witnesses to engage in any 
and all possible tests. However, In re Louisiana Energy 
Services, LP represents a significant ruling in that the 
court disqualifies the expert witness. Noting the case 
indicates that the expert’s credentials fell short. Instead, 
the expert was disqualified due to basing the opinion on 
secondary sources instead of a site-specific investigation. 
A more accurate analysis of the court’s opinion would 
classify the ruling as disqualifying the opinion, not the 
expert. If the expert would have done a site-specific 
investigation, he would likely have qualified.
Conclusions
The Bos case appears to impose extraordinary 
requirements on expert witnesses by discrediting expert 
testimony for, among other things, failing to use every 
possible test to characterize the site. The ruling remains 
unprecedented. However, examination of other cases 
involving expert witnesses, along with the pertinent 
Federal Rules of Evidence, on karst matters yields useful 
principles for expert witnesses and litigants. The Federal 
Rules of Evidence require that the expert possess the 
requisite expertise, the testimony is based on “sufficient 
facts and evidence” and “the product of reliable principles 
and methods”, and that these principles and methods are 
applied to the facts of the case. 
The Bos case illustrates how onerous the burden of proof 
may be on a party challenging an agency finding. That 
case suggests that the challenger may have to conduct 
“every possible study”. On the other hand, Karst 
Environmental Education and Protection explicitly 
stated that the agency “could have” done more, but 
upheld the agency’s investigation as adequate to meet 
the agency’s duty to take a “hard look”.
Court interpretations of the rules give greater weight 
to expert testimony that is (1) based on site-specific 
investigations and data; (2) includes specific and precise 
analysis; and (3) clearly links the data to specific 
impacts. The Bos case additionally suggests that the 
expert conduct every possible test that may aid in the 
